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D. A. Soberman*

Law Schools Under Attack

We are in danger of losing the creative tension in Canadian legal
education, a creative tension that has made the enterprise
worthwhile. Let me explain this rather large claim.
The academic study of law has a long history of close association
with universities of the western world. Law was a founding faculty
at the University of Bologna and formed part of all the great early
universities of mediaeval Europe. Despite the fact that many
students in these universities today do go on to careers in law, the
study of law remains an undergraduate liberal discipline for large
numbers who do not contemplate practising the profession. In
contrast, the law schools of North America were founded in
recognition of the fact that apprenticeship was not adequate as the
sole method of training lawyers. Thus university law faculties came
into existence to fill a market need for professional education.
Universities were, however, more than mere physical locations for
law faculties interested only in teaching traditional lawyering skills.
Gradually, within the great universities of the United States, their
law schools began to be recognized as places of learning, of critical
analysis, and of education for broader purposes than the private
practice of law. In Canada, Dalhousie, McGill, and, later,
Saskatchewan followed this model in aspiration, even if a lack of
resources made it difficult to follow in substance. Only in recent
decades have law faculties in the rest of the country adopted this
approach. At present, law faculties aspire, and must aspire, to serve
both goals - professional education and critical, scholarly study of
law and its role in society.
It is my claim that the creative tension in these faculties is a
unique and valuable asset when properly nurtured. Such centres of
learning are much more important than the mass undergraduate law
faculties of European universities, where legal training, which
occurs in large lecture halls and is based on dry treatises, might just
as well take place in their political science, history, or economics
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departments. The interaction of these faculties with, and their
effects on, contemporary society are negligible. Even less important
is the American proprietary law school, independent of university
ties and concerned solely with qualifying students for the bar.
The claim to uniqueness for university law faculties extends
further: we are unlike university faculties in other professional
disciplines, such as medicine and engineering. It is true that the
graduates of medical schools form a special elite in our society. They
are selected from among the best and the brightest, their education
is long and expensive, especially to the public purse, and the
rewards to members of the profession are substantial; public health
is a matter of prime importance. Nevertheless, medical education is
highly technical and specialized - it would be difficult to claim for
medical schools that they offer a broad university education. The
demands made on medical students to learn their discipline leaves
little time for broad questions of public policy as a major part of
their curriculum. One never says, "Study medicine. It will broaden
you and prepare you for other careers." Medicine is too expensive,
too all-consuming. An engineering education is much the same.
Students of engineering are permitted, sometimes encouraged, to
take a few courses outside their faculty in order to gain some
breadth. And there are some attempts to provide courses which
place engineering in a broader context. But undergraduate
engineering remains mainly a technical education. In this sense,
proprietary law schools may be considered pale imitations of
engineering departments.
University law faculties are very different. Jurisprudence, legal
history, comparative law, human rights, tax theory, sociology of
law, and the legal profession are but a few of the courses found in
university law faculties and which have little to do with technical
"tools of the trade". Even these courses are only part of the picture.
A critical university approach permeates other areas of study,
whether they be in criminal law or contracts, trusts or torts indeed, in virtually all areas of inquiry.
At the same time, university law faculties are not like
departments of history or political science. We demand more of our
students than is asked of undergraduates in other disciplines; yet we
abjure the narrow concentration of graduate thesis writing, where
students must uncover an unplowed corner and cultivate it into a
master's or doctoral dissertation. We do expect scholarly writing,
good analysis, and critical evaluation, as do other university
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disciplines. But we expect more: greater breadth, skills in applying
principles and rules to specific situations, and, increasingly,
exposure to clinical problems. So, on the one hand we expect our
students to be able to handle the intellectual and scholarly aspects of
university studies on a par with graduate students in other
disciplines, but with different emphasis. On the other hand, we
expect our students to be prepared to handle professional skills, at
least after some practical experience, even better than would
students who might obtain a "practical" training in proprietary law
schools - if they existed in Canada.
This creative tension of the professional and the academic sides,
as found in the university law faculty and in the demands made on
its students, is intensified when translated into the requirements of
university law teaching. University law teachers are expected to
produce scholarly works just as their colleagues in history and
economics are. But they are also expected to give their students
practical insights into the working of the law - into clinical
situations - as do their counterparts in medicine. In addition, their
professional expertise and academic impartiality create demands on
their services by governments to participate in policy formation for
new legislation and programs. These are tasks which do not often
confront historians, engineers, or physicians. The above observations about the various roles of law teachers are not by way of
complaint. On the contrary, they present extraordinary challenges
and opportunities for engaging in absorbing tasks. However, they
also present the dangers of dividing one's time and energies into too
many areas to be reasonably effective in any one of them.
We need to be aware of the unique combination of forces at work,
as well as the dangers, in university law teaching. It is important
that law faculties collectively recognize their sui generis position, or
else they will not be able to explain it to the rest of the university
and to the profession. Herein lies the danger. Outsiders who do not
understand the distinctive characteristics and role of the university
law school would undermine it by trying to change it in their own
image. First, within the university there are those who do not
understand this strange beast. A law faculty does not have hoards of
master's candidates and smaller numbers of doctoral candidates
justifying funding and providing manpower for research projects
and for teaching sections of that necessary evil, first year
undergraduate courses. Its professors do not turn out large numbers
of short articles, to appear in "refereed journals", upon which such
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a high premium is placed. This is not to say that all is well in law
faculties with respect to good scholarly output. Rather, it is to say
that the model presented to us by other disciplines is not for us;
indeed, other disciplines may have something to learn from the
better work of law faculties. In any event, an attempt to turn a law
faculty into an analogue for, say, a department of political science
would be unfortunate. The change would benefit neither law
students nor universities, nor would it meet societal needs. While
such a transformation of law faculties may be unlikely to occur,
continued sniping and general criticism from other parts of the
university are harmful: they destroy mutual understanding and
respect, and they leave law faculties feeling exposed and
unsupported in withstanding the second, more serious and
immediate attack from without the university, that by the
profession.
The legal profession in Ontario and most of the western provinces
has never abandoned its view that law schools exist for the purpose
of feeding the profession. The Law Society of Upper Canada
resisted for almost 100 years the attempts of Ontario universities to
begin university law schools. It was only in 1957, when the society
realized it could not meet the demand for lawyers, that it consented
to grant recognition to university legal education as part of the
process of call to the bar. While more enlightened leaders of the bar
recognize the broader dimensions of university legal education,
many others hold to the image of law faculties as solely a means to
produce practising lawyers. Two implications follow.
First, subordinating any other goals to that of training practising
lawyers means that the dominant task of the law faculty becomes
that of teaching the skills and providing the knowledge believed to
be required in current practice. Supporters of this view might be
willing to interpret teaching skills fairly broadly, to include careful
analysis of legal problems, including applicable statute and case
law, as well as "how to" skills, ranging from how to fill out forms
and find the right registry office to how to interview, negotiate, and
conduct a trial or appeal. They expect students to "know" land law,
taxation, and other practical fields, but they do not believe that it is
the task of the law school to devote resources to such concerns as
whether landlord and tenant laws or the incidence of income tax are
socially just. Supporters of this view would acknowledge that the
needs of practice change from time to time, but would add that they
are the judges of what is relevant and useful.
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The second implication is that a system designed to produce legal
practitioners should meet market needs as perceived by the
profession itself. The flow of graduates should be reduced or
increased as required to meet those needs alone, regardless of public
assessment of public needs, regardless of student demand for legal
education, and regardless of the general state of the economy as it
affects career prospects in other professions and disciplines. In this
view, it seems not to matter whether students in engineering,
commerce, or education will have jobs, or whether, if other
professions also succeeded in reducing the availability of education,
a generation of young people would thereby be cheated not only of
the chance for further education, but also of useful qualifications
needed in a future job market. Somehow, this group of lawyers
believes that it is a specially privileged class, entitled to protect its
current members from general economic problems of society.
Many ordinary lawyers would object that the implications I have
just asserted are unfair caricatures of the views of the practising bar.
I hope so, and would like them to speak up. Thus far in the debate of
the early 1980s, it has been the caricatures that have had the floor,
and the ear of the media. Unfortunately, if this production-line view
of legal education dominates the profession in the next few years,
law faculties are likely to suffer irreparable harm.
Quite apart from the merits of lawyers' entitlement to special
protection and apart from the feasibility of turning education on and
off to meet perceived demand, there remains a more basic claim
about the kind of education lawyers need. The traditional model of
the private practitioner is itself sadly defective. It is trite to note that
lawyers have an influential place in our society, that willy-nilly they
are cast into roles of leadership within the legal system itself - as
judges, legislators, and senior administrators. Outside the legal
system they find themselves in roles where they need to be able to
make critical assessments, both economic and social, of government decisions within the larger community.
At least as important, university legal education must not be
limited only to prospective lawyers. Students not interested in the
practice of law should be encouraged to attend law school in order
to benefit from what we have to offer. And students who may
initially consider practice as their primary goal should be
encouraged to examine other careers as well. It is because university
law faculties offer a unique blend of academic study and
professional application of learning that their programs are valuable
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in many callings outside the traditional practice of law. Accordingly, student numbers in law faculties must not be governed by the
production-line view of legal education.
There are sound reasons, then, to defend university law schools
from the assaults based on a misunderstanding of their special role.
However, that is not to say that they should be immune from
criticism, or that they are doing as much as we can reasonably
expect from them; there is much room for improvement. Those of
us who have experienced the decade and a half of explosive growth
after 1957, followed by the shock of a further decade of financial
constraint, are aware that our law faculties have not yet had the
chance to mature, that the age and experience profile of our teaching
staff is distorted, and that we have not yet learned how to cope with
the even greater explosion in legal information. The philosophy and
techniques of legal education are in question, and they should be.
These problems make legal education bewildering and exhausting
- and yet challenging and exciting. We need time, resources, and
constructive criticism from within and from without. But if, instead,
we are attacked by our academic brethren for not emulating them
and by our professional brethren for not being at their beck and call,
legal education will suffer and along with it the special contribution
it can make to Canadian society.

